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There is a large body of work demonstrating that infants are sensitive to the distinction 
between human and mechanical agents from the early months of life, with different expectations 
for how those agents move and interact with the world around them. Further, infants are able to 
understand scenes in which objects engage in functionally-relevant events. Lastly, this functional 
information can enhance how infants determine the number of objects in a scene.  
Infants aged 9 months watched two kinds of hands (human or mechanical) engage in 
functionally-relevant priming events, which allowed the infants to link surface color of the object 
to the distinct function (wherein color becomes of predictive value). Then the infants watched 
two kinds of event-mapping test events (color change or control), to assess object individuation. 
We assessed total duration of looking to the color change and control test events. Results 
revealed that infants use color as predictive value after watching the human hands perform 
functionally-relevant events, but not if infants watched mechanical hands perform the same 
functionally-relevant events. The discussion examines the importance of this finding, and how 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
If you saw your roommate pick up a book, what would you think would happen next? 
Witnessing this action on an object, the most likely scenario is that she will open the book and 
begin reading. Or, what if you saw your roommate take a glass out of the cabinet and pull a jug 
of milk from the fridge – what would happen next? Adult humans can figure this puzzle out with 
ease, without much conscious effort. You would assume your roommate is going to pour herself 
a glass of milk and drink it, in large part because adults see and participate in these kinds of 
events.  
Infants are also capable of parsing complex scenarios, which combine agents, objects, 
actions, and outcomes. Research has demonstrated the progression of how infants learn about 
their world, and how this changes over their development, which informs researchers about what 
infants learn and how they apply that knowledge to future events they witness. 
This dissertation will examine theories and present research around the topic of object 
individuation and priming with functionally relevant events in infants. However, since this topic 
is broad and complex, I will discuss related points in finer detail. Developmental researchers 
capitalize on infant’s novelty preference (Reynolds, 2015). By showing infants objects first 
hidden from view and then measuring infants’ response to a reappearing object, we can better 
understand the expectations that infants have about how objects move through space and time. 
First, I will cover object individuation and the features of objects that infants use to tell one 
object from another. These may be features like shape, size, color, or other features like sound, 
labels, or category membership. Second, infants are sensitive to the functional aspects of objects, 




perceptual and conceptual information. Third, function priming is one way to increase an infant’s 
sensitivity to specific characteristics of an object, which can help them during the object 
individuation process. Fourth, agency is important for infants: who is performing an action or 
event, and what are the goals of the action in question? 
 Why does this matter? We live in an increasingly automated world. How will interaction 
with avatars, robots around the home, or automation influence how infants learn from their 
environment? Infants may encounter agents that are not human. Thus, it is critical to understand 
how infants respond to different agents and how that influences what they learn and know. In the 
educational setting, we have already seen changes, where children are learning from avatars or 
animated entities.  
 A major aspect of importance in studying the developing infant is that infant will 
inevitably grow and change throughout adolescence and adulthood. Infants engage with and 
learn from their environment, which ultimately affect their course of development. Further, some 
infants are not on a typical developmental track – for instance, infants with intellectual 
disabilities or autism spectrum disorders. What makes these infants distinct from others at the 
same age? How can we find early markers for intellectual disabilities, and thus, provide earlier 
care and interventions to ensure a more successful outcome?  
 These topics – object representations, agents and their goals, and infants’ ability to 
discriminate how many objects are in a scene – are at the heart of the “core knowledge systems” 
proposed, with their existence supported by strong evidence from experimental research (Spelke 
& Kinzler, 2007). These topics work in coordination and are related to the study of how infants 




2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Object Individuation and Object Features 
To understand our world, we must keep track of the objects that constantly enter and 
leave our field of vision. Although it sounds simple and automatic, object tracking is quite 
complex, relying on a series of networks and hierarchies that grow and change from birth. For 
example, the ability to use particular features of objects change throughout an infant’s 
development and appear to be hierarchically organized (Káldy & Leslie, 2003; Wilcox, 1999). 
These organizational networks influence how we learn about our world, understand our 
surroundings, and determine what is important and what requires attention.  
Even infants a few months of age can recognize that an object retains its identity, even if 
it leaves their immediate sight. It has been shown that infants do have ability to identify and track 
objects across space and time (Wilcox & Schweinle, 2003). An infant must be able to hold in 
mind an object’s features, location, and trajectory in order to determine later whether it is distinct 
from another object seen.  
Object individuation is the process by which we determine whether one object is distinct 
from another. This process involves the use of spatial and temporal cues, object categories, 
perceptual information like features, and conceptual information like labels. In short, object 
individuation answers the question, “how many objects are there?” On the other hand, object 
identification is the process of determining what an object is, using perceptual and conceptual 
properties of the object. Object identification answers the question, “which one is that?” 
Together, individuation and identification constitute the “what,” “where,” and “when” of 




and object individuation is the “where” and “when” component (or “how,” see Goodale & 
Milner, 1992). One way to study how infants understand objects is to use occlusion paradigms 
— when an object has left immediate sight and then reappears. This paper will focus only on 



















Figure 1. Event monitoring events featuring (a) narrow-screen and (b) wide-screen color-change 
events. The narrow screen cannot conceivably conceal two objects, while the wide screen can. If 
infants individuate these objects by color (e.g., interpret the scene as two objects), then infants 
will look longer at (a) than (b), since it will be a surprising result to hide two different objects 






In experimental settings, infant researchers use several types of occlusion events typically 
to test object individuation. Two main kinds of tasks used in the visual domain are: event 
monitoring and event mapping (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998a,b). Event monitoring involves an 
object moving from one side to another behind an occlusion screen that never changes or moves 
(Figure 1). This is in opposition to event mapping, which involves an object moving from one 
side to another behind an occlusion screen that eventually is removed to reveal the entire stage. 












Figure 2. Event mapping: A red ball moves behind an occluder, and reemerges on the 
other side, as a green object (color-change condition), or (b) a green ball moves behind an 
occluder and emerges on the other side as a green ball (control condition). If infants 
individuate by color, then infants will look longer at final one-ball display in the color-
change than the control condition, since they will expect to see two objects on the stage 





Infants can also participate in occlusion search tasks, where objects are occluded and then 
infants are allowed to search for them (McCurry, Wilcox, & Woods, 2009), or other types of 
containment tasks (e.g., putting an object in a box, or covering it with a box, see (Baillargeon, Li, 
Gertner, & Wu, 2011). While these kinds of tasks contribute greatly to the understanding of how 
infants individuate objects, given the complexity of search tasks and the additional working 
memory demands associated with multisensory object exploration, those are not the focus of this 
paper. 
2.2 Development of Object Individuation  
 If you see your roommate put a gallon of milk in the refrigerator in the morning, and pull 
out a gallon of orange juice in the afternoon, you know without much thought that the two 
gallon-sized jugs are different, since they contain different liquids. Or if you see a gallon jug of 
milk enter the refrigerator in the morning, and a half-gallon carton of milk comes out in the 
afternoon, you know the two objects are different since they differ in size and shape. Infants, like 
adults, are also sensitive to properties of objects, like size, shape, and category, and use these 
properties to individuate objects (Wilcox, 1999). 
In another example, if you see your roommate put a gallon of milk in the refrigerator in 
the morning and then in the afternoon remove a gallon of milk to fill a glass, you can infer that it 
is the same gallon of milk in both instances. If you witness your roommate holding a gallon of 
milk three months later, however, or if she pulls a gallon of milk out of the refrigerator at her 
parent’s house, you can likely infer that it is not the same gallon of milk. Milk does not travel by 
itself, and is susceptible to spoiling, making it unlikely to be the same gallon of milk months 
later. Infants, too, are sensitive to these kinds of spatiotemporal discontinuities during object 




Previous object individuation research using event monitoring and event mapping 
paradigms with infants has helped determine (a) which features of objects infants use to tell 
whether objects are distinct, and (b) the developmental hierarchy of these abilities (Wilcox, 
1999). Spatiotemporal information – that is, where is the object and when – is highly salient and 
often used by infants during the individuation process. For example, infants as young as 4.5 
months can also use spatiotemporal information – namely, speed of disappearance and 
subsequent reappearance – to infer the presence of more than one object (Wilcox & Schweinle, 
2003). However, objects contain a vast array of properties: size, shape, color, complexity, and 
usefulness. Infants can use many different object features during the individuation process – 
thus, the question asked was which features are used by infants, and does this change over the 
course of development? 
In a seminal study investigating a developmental hierarchy of features used by infants 
during object individuation tasks, Wilcox (1999) exposed infants aged 4.5-11.5 months to 
scenarios involving event monitoring to test their object individuation capabilities with objects 
differing in shape, size, pattern, and color. The results indicated that the youngest group of 
infants aged 4.5 months used shape and size information to individuate objects. Infants aged 7.5 
months, but not those aged 4.5 months, used surface pattern (e.g., striped versus polka dotted) to 
individuate objects. Further, infants aged 11.5 months, but not those aged 7.5 or 9.5 months, used 
surface color (e.g., red versus green) to individuate objects. Together, these experiments 
demonstrate a developmental hierarchy in the features that infants use to individuate objects. 
Younger infants use form features, like shape and size, while older infants can add more skills by 




of objects infants use during the individuation process, this paper will focus mainly on surface 
feature properties, such as color. 
2.3 Color-Function Priming  
 
You and your roommate like different kinds of milk: you prefer 1% milk, which has a 
green cap, but your roommate drinks whole milk, which has a red cap. When you look in the 
refrigerator, you always search for the green cap, because you have linked the feature “green 
cap” with the corresponding object “1% milk.” Infants, too, can be (a) primed to attend to 
surface feature differences between objects, and (b) link surface features to objects, which 
researchers can capitalize on by using event-monitoring occlusion sequences (Wilcox, 1999). 
However, is this developmental hierarchy for how infants use form and surface information 
fixed, or is it malleable based on information received from the environment? Are infants 
sensitive to featural information if it is highlighted or shown to be important? If so, is it possible 
that infants will use this featural information to individuate object earlier in their development? 
Previous research indicated that infants do not spontaneously individuate by color during 
an event-monitoring task until aged 11.5 months (Wilcox, 1999). In a series of experiments, 
infants aged 7.5-9.5 months watched events, which highlighted the importance of a surface 
feature – color. The purpose was to highlight surface features as important. The events consisted 
of a red cup scooping and pouring salt, and a green cup pounding a wooden nail. Infants watched 
multiple pairs of these events successively, pound followed by pour (or vice versa). The function 
of the objects differed, as did their color, and – most importantly – the function was intimately 
linked to the color: green always pounded and red always poured.  
Infants then watched either a narrow-screen or wide-screen occlusion task (Wilcox & 




(a) link color to a specific function, using function as a salient feature of the objects, and (b) be 
primed, applying the highlighted color sensitivity to a separate occlusion task. Thus, infants 
should see the red cup scooping and pouring and link “scoop/pour” to “red.” 
One additional factor was involved: one group of infants watched just one set of cups 
perform the priming tasks, while another group of infants watched two sets of cups. Infants all 
watched the same number of trials, but some infants saw two pairs of cups performing the tasks. 
We would not expect the same result for infants in the one exemplar condition, as those infants 
would believe that each cup performing the task was an individual, and not apply the color-
function link to all green and red objects. In contrast, the infants who watched multiple cups 
perform the task would form a category, and apply the color-function priming link to all red and 
green objects.  
The priming trials were first, followed by occlusion test trials to assess object 
individuation. The occlusion trials were narrow-screen and wide-screen event monitoring tasks 
(Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998a,b), where infants saw a green ball move behind an occluder and 
emerge as a red ball (color-change). If the priming task was effective, then we would expect the 
infants in the two-exemplar conditions to evidence prolonged looking. 
 Infants aged 9.5 months who watched only one exemplar pair perform the tasks looked 
equally at the wide- and narrow-screen test trials (Figure 1). However, infants who watched two 
exemplar pairs looked longer during the narrow-screen occlusion test trials than infants who 
were in the wide-screen condition. This means that infants who saw two red cups scoop and 
pour, and two green cups pound a nail, could (a) link color to function, (b) form a category, and 
(c) apply that knowledge to a novel object individuation task. Additionally, 7.5 month olds also 




exemplar priming trials, with three different cup pairs (Wilcox & Chapa, 2004). Infants aged 9.5 
months linked specific colors to the function, but did not link the color differences to function 
more generally (Wilcox, Woods, & Chapa, 2008), illustrating that infants can use color 
differences to help them build categories.  
Slightly younger infants aged 9 months benefit from additional comparison information 
during priming. For example, this comparison process consists of watching one colored spoon 
stir, while another different colored spoon sits to the side of the event in progress. The 
comparison process seems especially beneficial for younger infants, by “supporting the 
abstraction of commonalities and rules” that can be generalized to a broader set of situations 
(Wilcox et al., 2008). Benefits during the comparison process could also possibly reflect 
bolstering short-term memory in infants, gently reminding them that there are two kinds of 
objects, each performing different events. 
Infants can (a) track regularities in the scenes they witness, (b) form relevant relations 
between these things, and (c) use these regularities to make predictions about what will happen 
next. For instance, when infants watch multiple different red cups perform the same action, and 
multiple different green cups perform the same action (distinct from the red cups), infants can 
learn to link things like “red-scoop” and “green-pound,” and draw from that information in novel 
contexts (like an occlusion task) to make decisions.  
Interestingly, if color-function priming is disrupted by not having a physical functional 
link between the cups and the events (e.g., if the cups merely make the motions of the functional 
events, without scooping or pounding), there is no priming and thus no increased sensitivity to 
color during subsequent event-monitoring tasks (Wilcox & Chapa, 2004). It appears there is a 




the action has a functionally-relevant outcome. Further, if surface features of objects are 
demonstrated to have predictive value, through a functional event, then infants can use that 
information to predict outcomes of later events. For instance, if the infant witnesses “red-scoop” 
multiple times, with multiple object exemplars, that color-function link has predictive value to 
potentially other action-object sequences. However, if this outcome is not functionally relevant, 
the surface features of objects are of no predictive value. (More about the importance of 
functional events will be described in the next section.) 
These results indicate that there still exists a developmental hierarchy for the featural 
information infants use to individuate objects, but is malleable with additional information and 
training. When infants as young as 7.5 months watch priming pre-test events and can link color 
to functional property of an object, they will later evidence individuation-by-color.  
Sensitivity to the surface features of objects can be highlighted during a short task prior to an 
occlusion test event, leading to earlier use of the surface features to individuate objects than 
spontaneously occurs in infants (Wilcox & Chapa, 2004; Wilcox, Smith, & Woods, 2011; 
Wilcox et al., 2008). These results indicate that infants can learn information about objects from 
their environment, and give insight into the types of experiences to which infants are more 
sensitive. 
2.4 The Functional Nature of Objects  
 
In the previous section on color-function priming, we learned how the functional 
relevance of actions by objects is critical to infants’ use of color as a predictive feature. But what 
does it mean when an object has a “function?” 
Object function can be defined in many ways. One description is as “a simple action-




(e.g., appearance, action, sound) and conceptual (e.g., goals of an actor, intentions of the creator) 
in nature” (Baumgartner & Oakes, 2011); or as “an agent-produced action on an object that the 
object affords and/or for which it was intended, either by design or conventional use” (Wilcox et 
al., 2008). These definitions consider the affordances (e.g., possible uses) of an object, an actor’s 
goal, and actions that produce a specific outcome. While these definitions consider several 
aspects, the widely held definition of “function” varies among researchers who use it, and is still 
up for debate (Oakes & Madole, 2008). One critical feature may be argued, however, that 
function is an “emergent property” of an object, arising from a combination of perceptual 
features plus the use of the object (Oakes & Madole, 2008).  
For example, adults easily understand that a cup is used to contain, scissors are used to 
cut, and so on. In the kitchen example, the function of a refrigerator is to contain and preserve a 
jug of milk. This function arises out of several components of the refrigerator: the materials used, 
how it is constructed, its capability to make and contain cold air inside of it, and that person can 
open the door to insert and remove items. These features combine to create an “emergent 
property,” which is understood as refrigeration: to contain and preserve food. If the refrigerator 
did not have the ability to keep food cold, it would not function as expected. If the refrigerator 
was cold inside, but was not accessible via doors to contain and store food, it would not function 
as expected. Further, in these examples, there exist objects, actions upon those objects, outcomes 
of the actions, and agents – whether that is through implicit goals of an agent (e.g., want to keep 
the milk cold) or through tangible actions upon objects (e.g., opening the refrigerator door).  
Infants have a more rudimentary knowledge of objects’ functions than adults, but infants 
can learn quickly. The functional attributes of objects help guide infants in making decisions 




objects. For example, 9-month-old infants can grasp and use a handle of a brush or spoon in 
functional ways appropriate for the object (McCarty, Clifton, & Collard, 2001). Additionally, 
there has been research to determine the specific functional characteristics and relations that 
infants use during categorization and object individuation processes.  
If function is considered an emergent property of an object, then to truly understand 
function, infants must be able to link multiple object properties together and understand the 
relationship between those object properties. Indeed, evidence of a developmental trajectory may 
exist for infants between 8 and 12 months of age, involving the change from “encoding 
individual features of events to encoding the relations between those features” (Baumgartner & 
Oakes, 2011). If a yellow object clicks when it is rolled, then the important aspects to encode are 
the relational links of appearance (yellow) – action (roll) – outcome (click sound). For instance, 
infants aged 8 months encode individual features of the objects presented – appearance (color), 
action, and sound the object makes. However, infants aged 12 months were more sensitive than 
the infants aged 8 month to the relationship between those features: if a yellow object always 
squeaked when it was rolled, infants were more surprised to see that yellow object squeak if it 
was squeezed (Baumgartner & Oakes, 2011). Those infants had linked yellow-roll-squeak, and 
found yellow-squeeze-squeak to be a surprising event. This also reflects an increase in 
sophistication in the parts of an event which infants use to individuate: younger infants aged 8 
months use the properties of the object itself (appearance, action, sound) to individuate, but older 
infants aged 12 months link those properties together, and are more sensitive to the relations 
between those properties (Baumgartner & Oakes, 2011). As adults, we would be surprised if our 
refrigerator did not keep our food cold, per our expectations, and we would recognize there was a 




Supporting this developmental trajectory, there is evidence that infants aged 10 months 
old encode the link between actions and outcomes, but do not encode a link between an object’s 
appearance and an outcome (Perone, Madole, & Oakes, 2011). This seems to be an intermediate 
step in the action-object-outcome relation, which does not consider perceptual or object 
information as critical as the action-outcome component. Unlike the infants aged 8 months in 
Baumgartner & Oakes (2011), who only encoded individual object features, or the infants aged 
12 months, who encoded the full appearance—action—outcome relationship, infants aged 10 
months appear to be in the middle, by encoding the link of some relationships between multiple 
object features, but not all. This ability to link all object features, whether they are related to 
appearance, action, or the resulting outcome, seems to develop over the first year of life and is 
refined through further experience. 
Further, when an object covaries on appearance and function, infants aged 12 months 
will link those two properties together (Kingo & Krøjgaard, 2012). Infants aged 12 months are 
also sensitive to the relationship between the action performed by an object, and the subsequent 
outcome – a “plausible cause-effect relation” (Träuble & Pauen, 2011). These studies, which 
demonstrate infants’ ability to link together an object’s properties and form relations between 
those properties, underscore their ability to understand function as an emergent property of an 
object.  
Functional information can aid infants in categorization of objects. In the absence of 
other information, infants aged 11-12 months use overall perceptual similarity in objects to 
categorize them; however, after witnessing the functional nature of the objects, infants will 
categorize based on part similarity – that is, the part of the object used to demonstrate the 




demonstration of a functional event. A follow-up study indicated that infants aged 12 months old 
use the causally-relevant information from events to categorize objects based on their part 
similarity; this was not the case in a condition where the function of the object was demonstrated 
in the absence of a “plausible cause-effect relation” (Träuble & Pauen, 2011). Infants categorized 
objects based on overall perceptual similarity, unless they are shown an event with a functional 
outcome using a specific part of the object. For example, if infants see a t-shaped hook on the 
object can pull a loop, which causes a resulting sound, then infants will categorize other objects 
as similar if they have a t-shaped part. However, if the event highlighting the specific t-part of 
the object has no functional outcome during the event (e.g., no resulting sound), then infants 
again use overall perceptual similarity to categorize the objects. Thus, infants are sensitive to the 
relationship between the action performed by an object, and the subsequent outcome. These 
results indicate that merely highlighting a specific part of the object itself does not induce 
categorization, but demonstrating the functional link between action-object-outcome does. The 
functional nature of objects also facilitates categorization in infants aged 16 months; however, 
merely making a motion similar to the function does not allow infants to categorize. In order to 
effectively categorize objects, they must share functions across multiple exemplars, but infants 
only need to see a single exemplar to apply the same function category to a novel object (Booth, 
Schuler, & Zajicek, 2010). 
Functional information can also help facilitate infants during object individuation tasks 
when there is differing appearance information. Infants aged 12 months will not use function (in 
this case, an auditory cue) alone or appearance alone to individuate objects, but when an object 
covaries on function and appearance, infants will link those two properties together and persist in 




understanding of function as an emergent property – one featural change is not sufficient, but 
multiple featural changes appear to signal a difference between the objects. Further, infants’ 
ability to identify the link between the feature changes is also critical. 
Functional uses of objects are also useful in priming infants to attend to specific object 
features (Wilcox & Chapa, 2004; Wilcox et al., 2008). For example, if a red cup always scoops 
and pours rice, and a green cup always hammers a wooden nail, then the action and object have 
an outcome, and are considered functionally-relevant. If the red cup just mimics the action of 
scooping and pouring, without physically contacting the container of rice (e.g., without an action 
outcome), then it is not functionally-relevant. Infants who watch functionally-relevant events can 
link properties of the object performing the action (e.g., color or pattern) with the action (e.g., 
scooping or pounding). Then on later object individuation tasks, they apply what they learned 
previously – that red objects are distinct from green objects – and can succeed in the 
individuation task and individuate by color. However, function priming only works when the 
event is (a) functionally relevant, and (b) when the object is only used for one specific function 
(e.g., an object cannot be used for multiple functions; red cups only scoop salt and green cups 
only pound the nail; Wilcox & Chapa, 2004). If the object just mimics the action without 
physically performing the action (e.g., in the absence of a causal link), there is no color-function 
link and no priming to sensitivity to color information in the later individuation task. Further, 
infants can use information about function more broadly to form categories, helping them make 
predictions about objects (Wilcox et al., 2008).  
Object knowledge is comprised of what an object is and how it is used. The underlying 
assumptions of the affordance-matching hypothesis is that “manipulation and function 




understanding the actions of others” (Bach, Nicholson, & Hudson, 2014). According to the 
affordance-matching hypothesis, object function is tightly coupled with object manipulation. 
Observed goals can predict object function; object function can also predict goals of an agent. 
Further, how an object is manipulated can predict an agent’s behavior, but observed behavior can 
also predict how an object is used (Bach et al., 2014). For example, if you know your friend is 
packing to move and enters the room carrying a newspaper, you may not immediately infer that 
they are going to sit and down to read – instead, you might infer that your friend will use the 
newspaper to safely pack her dishes and glassware. The observed goal is moving, which informs 
the predicted function of the newspaper. If you see a person pick up a can opener, you can 
predict their goal is to open a can. The function of the observed object is to open cans, which 
informs the inferred goals of the agent. For infants, this object knowledge aids infants in both 
predicting and interpreting action movements.  
2.4.1 The Function Equation 
There are many components to what comprises a functional outcome. One previously 
mentioned definition of function is “a simple action-object-outcome relation” (Kingo & 
Krøjgaard, 2012). Based on other research, agent could also be considered in the following 
equation: 
 
Action + Agent + Object + Outcome = Function 
 
How important are each of these components to creating the “emergent property” of 
function? Consider the equation above. If one of the operands is removed from the equation, the 




motor behaviors and motor predictions. The agent component includes the agent (e.g., 
appearance, identity) and their goals. The object component includes characteristics and 
affordances (e.g., uses and purposes). The outcome component includes any relevant result from 
the action-object sequence. Let us take a closer look at evidence to support this concept. 
How important is action to the emergent property of function? An event with an agent, 
object, and outcome, without any action on the object, seems unlikely to be considered 
functional. In fact, affordance matching tightly couples action and objects (Bach et al., 2014), 
where: (a) observed goals can predict object function, (b) object function can predict goals of an 
agent, (c) how an object is manipulated can predict an agent’s behavior, and (d) observed 
behavior can predict how an object is used. Thus, action knowledge is critical for understanding 
and planning one’s own actions on objects, as well as interpreting actions on objects by another. 
Further, infants form links between motor actions and the “sensory consequences” (e.g., 
outcomes) of these actions (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). Therefore, without action, it is 
unlikely that there is the perception of an object function.  
How important is the presence of an object to the emergent property of function? Since 
“most human actions involve objects, either as the recipient to be acted upon, or as a tool to be 
acted with,” the presence of an object is critical to function (Bach et al., 2014). Also, “infants 
represent actions as organized by the relation between agent and object” (Woodward, 2009). One 
example of action by an agent with an outcome could be communication, gestures, or language. 
However, it could be argued that language is privileged and not in the same category as a 
functional event. Therefore, without the presence of an object, there may not be the perception of 




How important is an outcome to the emergent property of function? For example, without 
an outcome, an action on an object is merely an action. Indeed, while extant research indicates 
that while infants can be primed during functional events, infants are not primed by non-
functional events (e.g., those without a functional outcome; Wilcox & Chapa, 2004). Thus, 
outcome appears to be critical to the equation, and without an outcome, there is no priming. 
Within the affordance matching framework, we witness the outcome of the actions on objects 
and store this knowledge for later, helping us infer how an object can be used in the future (Bach 
et al., 2014). For instance, scissors cut paper, and this knowledge comes, in part, from witnessing 
the action (cutting) upon an object (paper) to a desired outcome (the paper is cut). Further, 
infants expect actions to be associated with outcomes (e.g., “goal states”), as actions are a means 
to an end outcome (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Therefore, without a plausible outcome, there may 
not be the perception of an object function. 
How important is an agent to the emergent property of function? As previously 
demonstrated, if there is no object, action, or outcome, there is no function; therefore, these as 
those are at least perceptually crucial pieces. What can be said about the presence of an agent 
within a functional event? 
Agent is typically an assumed part of a functional event, without being substantiated. If 
something has a function, but it not acted upon, it has potential, but has not fulfilled the potential 
– which is why action is critical to the formula. Infants are sensitive to agent-produced 
information; in fact, agent produced motions are beneficial for category formation with infants 
aged 14 months, because “the interactions between agents and objects play a special role in 
infants’ discovery of new categories” (Booth, 2000). Agents are critical to the use of objects, as 




(Bach et al., 2014). Infants can predict outcomes of actions and understand other’s actions 
(Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). (The next section further elaborates the discussion of agents.)  
“Actions are defined by goals and not the specific procedures by which they are 
implemented. They are initiated from within by motives…” (von Hofsten, 2012). This 
demonstrates that goals and desires by an agent are the driving force for actions on objects. 
Actions don’t exist in the absence of motives. Therefore, agency is tightly linked with objects, 
actions on objects, goals, and outcomes. However, it is unknown exactly how agency is truly 
related to the emergent property of function. 
While it appears that agency may be a critical component of function, there is not extant 
work that exists to determine whether the presence of agent – which in prior research is typically 
human – is essential to the emergent property of function. It is also unknown whether the 
absence of an agent would eliminate the perception of function. Further, it is unknown what 
kinds of agents (e.g., human/non-human, animate/inanimate) are critical to the property of 
function. There are many assumptions that underlie researcher’s definitions of “function.”  One 
possibility is that agent could comprise a sub-part of “action.” Another possibility is that agent is 
a separate part of the equation, a necessary critical component of the perception of function.  
One piece of evidence for the importance of agency to function is from a neuroimaging 
study with infants aged 8 months. Results indicated that an interaction of a human agent and an 
event with a functional outcome causes an increase in oxy-hemoglobin (HbO) in the left middle 
temporal region (Biondi, Boas, & Wilcox, 2016). This interaction was not present when (a) the 
agent was a mechanical hand, or (b) when the outcome did not have a distinct cause-effect 
relation (Biondi, et al, 2016). Thus, an increase in cortical response was only evident when the 




agent to function. Based on this neuroimaging research, it could be predicted that the component 
of agent stands alone as relevant to the perception of function, and whether infants easily 
understand the agent’s goals is also linked to who (e.g., what kind of agent) is performing the 
action. This result shines some light on the neural underpinnings for how infants interpret agents 
within the context of functional events, and may possibly help to determine the role of agent in 
understanding of function. (This question of agency will be further addressed in the next section 
and as part of the predictions for the current proposal.) 
2.4.2 Function: Considerations and Caveats 
Several issues arise when dealing with the concept of object function. When researchers 
consider an object’s function, they do so typically from their own perspective. And although we 
have data to suggest that infants are sensitive to the “functional” nature of objects, we do not 
really know what may constitute a true “object function” from the infant perspective (Oakes & 
Madole, 2008). An important consideration is that what adults think of as an object’s “function” 
may not be apparent to infants (Baumgartner & Oakes, 2011). For example, should an object’s 
resulting clicking sound after it is rolled across a table (Baumgartner & Oakes, 2011) be 
considered a true object function? 
These discrepancies and questions may be due, in part, to the elusive, non-obvious nature 
of function. The understanding of “function” come from our history of watching others use these 
objects, using the objects ourselves, and drawing upon memories of past experiences even 
simply when we see objects. Conversely, the mere passive usage of an object in its functional 
capacity is simple to comprehend, since we have experience seeing people use objects, and using 
the objects ourselves, both of which we draw from without thinking. However, since adults may 




prove elusive, and may contribute to the wide discrepancies in the definition of “function” we 
see in the literature. Thus, there seems to be an opportunity for more clarification within the 
philosophical debate of object function, as well as determination of what “function” means for 
the developing infant. 
Researchers do have data to suggest that infants understand the relationship between 
multiple features of an object, including appearance and function (Baumgartner & Oakes, 2011; 
Kingo & Krøjgaard, 2012), action and outcome (Perone et al., 2011), and in general, 
understanding of the relationship between the features that give rise to the perception of function 
(Oakes & Madole, 2008). The function of an object helps infants learn information from new 
objects and that can be applied to already-known objects in novel contexts and situations 
(Wilcox et al., 2008). The function of an object can help infants categorize (Träuble & Pauen, 
2007, 2011), individuate (Kingo & Krøjgaard, 2012; Wilcox & Chapa, 2004), and predict both 
actions and outcomes (Bach et al., 2014). The function of an object can also be one which 
highlights links between features, priming infants to use featural information during object 
individuation (Wilcox & Chapa, 2004; Wilcox et al., 2008). Finally, neuroimaging results have 




What adults consider as an “agent” comprises of multiple components. First, the agent 
has a set of specific features and physical characteristics. For example, a human agent looks 
distinctively human, with a head containing two eyes and other sensory organs, and with hands 
that reach and apprehend objects. Human agents move with biological motion patterns, on their 




other kinds of agents, be they mechanical, animal, or other (Chouchourelou, Golden, & Shiffrar, 
2013; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Woodward, 1998, 2009).  
Second, agents have goals, and make specific actions to attain their goals. Infants can 
reason about an agent’s goals (Király, Jovanovic, Prinz, Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003; Luo & 
Baillargeon, 2010), and may have expectations that an agent will make rational decisions 
regarding attaining their goals (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Action may even be considered a major 
component of goal processing (Sommerville & Woodward, 2010). These components interact to 
help infants form representations about agents and their goals.  
 Even very young infants can discriminate human versus non-human agents, are sensitive 
to the perceptual qualities that comprise a human agent, and have expectations for how agents 
should behave and act. For example, from the early days of life, infants prefer human faces as 
opposed to patterns, shapes, or other types of visual stimuli (Fantz, 1963).  
 Not only can infants discern the differences between human and other kinds of agents, 
but their skills to differentiate agents is refined throughout the course of their development. For 
instance, infants aged 6 months view biological motion is as animate (Schlottmann & Ray, 
2010). By 9 months, infants can attribute reaching goals to a particular individual, with the 
understanding that different individuals can have different goals (Buresh & Woodward, 2007). 
Infants aged 10 months can individuate self-propelled agents from inert objects (Surian & Caldi, 
2010). Infants aged 12 months expect agents to behave rationally based on the “situational 
constraints” in the environment, the action, and the agent’s goal state or intentions (Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003). Like function, it appears that infants become more sophisticated in the features 





 Research has shown that infants have different expectations about how human and non-
human agents behave, and associate goals to them differently. For instance, infants at 6 months 
of age can differentiate between the goals of different kinds of agents (Woodward, 1998). 
Evidence exists that: (a) infants can discriminate human agents versus non-human agents, and (b) 
and infants assign goal-directed behavior to human agents, but do not reliably do so for non-
human agents. Infants assume human agents have goals and can link those goals to individual 
people (Buresh & Woodward, 2007). Infants mirror their own actions to the goals they see and 
an infant’s own action experience can influence how they attribute goals to agents (Longo & 
Bertenthal, 2006; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005). On the other hand, infants may 
not act similarly if the agent is not human, say, a mechanical hand or an inert rod (Woodward, 
1998). However, this is based on action cues, the environmental constraints, and amount of 
experience or training with the agent. Infants may have expectations about human agents and 
their goal-directed behavior, but these expectations may not be applied to non-human agents 
(Jovanovic et al., 2007). It is possible for infants to ascribe a non-human agent with goals, but 
there are specific conditions under which this occurs. 
 In a seminal study, infants watched a human hand reaching for one of two objects, 
followed by multiple trials of the same hand reaching to the same object. Then the positions of 
the objects were switched. If the infants looked longer when the hand reached for the new object 
in the old location with the same path, it would be taken as evidence that the infants were 
surprised to see the hand the reach for the new object, and attributed the hand to have a specific 
goal of the old object. Indeed, the infants aged 6 months who participated were more surprised, 
evidenced by increased looking, when the hand switched goals and reached for the new object 




or occluder, infants looked equally when (a) the mechanical agent reached for the old object in 
the new location, and (b) when the mechanical agent reached for the new object in the old 
location. This signaled that the infants did not form expectations about whether the mechanical 
agent had a goal (Woodward, 1998).  
Understanding other’s action intentions is also linked with an infant’s own action 
experience, as “active action experience is crucial for infants’ developing action understanding” 
(Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). Take, for instance, the A-not-B task. During the canonical A-not-
B task, an infant typically watches an experimenter hide a toy in one of two locations. Then the 
infant is given an opportunity to search for the toy. Once it is discovered, the toy is hidden again. 
After hiding and subsequently removing the toy from location A multiple times, the 
experimenter then hides the toy at the alternative location B. Infants younger than 12 months of 
age will usually incorrectly continue to search for the toy at location A, although they have seen 
the toy moved to location B. Indeed, infants aged 9 months make A-not-B errors when given the 
opportunity to search for objects themselves. Infants even make these errors when simply 
watching an experimenter hide and retrieve the toy, in the absence of the infants’ ability to act on 
objects themselves, as long as the action is one the infants themselves could perform (Longo & 
Bertenthal, 2006). However, infants aged 9 and 12 months do not commit these A-not-B search 
errors when the agent is a mechanical hand – an agent so dissimilar from the infant that there is 
no possibility of motorically matching the mechanical agent’s movements onto their own (Boyer, 
Pan, & Bertenthal, 2011; Moriguchi, Matsunaka, Itakura, & Hiraki, 2012). This action 
experience seems to be a critical component of how infants understand an agent’s actions and 
goals. Infants younger than 12 months may be “biologically tuned” to human agents as opposed 




their action understanding during observation and execution (Boyer et al., 2011; Longo & 
Bertenthal, 2006).  
Indeed, first person experience with actions and objects aids infants in understanding an 
agent’s goals (Woodward, 2009). To support this claim, infants aged 3 months, who normally 
don’t have the dexterity to grasp objects, were given training experience acting on objects (e.g., 
reaching and apprehending). Training and experience increased their sensitivity to another 
person’s hand attaining a goal in the classic Woodward (1998) paradigm (Sommerville et al., 
2005). Infants who did not have the training experience did not show goal inference for the 
human hand in the test trials. Therefore, the infants’ experience with their own ability to achieve 
an action goal helped aid them in understanding a goal reach from another agent.   
 Similar to the reach training, infants are sensitive to short episodes of learning about 
objects (Wilcox & Chapa, 2004). Understanding agency is no exception, as experience, training, 
and other cues can change infants’ perception of agency for non-human agents. Infants who 
simply watch the mechanical hands do not fail the A-not-B task (i.e., do not incorrectly persist in 
searching the wrong location). However, after prior experience with both the mechanical claw 
and its function, infants fail in the A-not-B task, showing performance akin to infants who watch 
a human perform the A-not-B task (i.e., incorrectly persist in searching the wrong location; 
Boyer et al., 2011). After experience with the mechanical hands, infants can assign a goal-
orientation to the agent and demonstrate a “relation between the means and the ends” (Boyer et 
al., 2011). Not only can infants imitate mechanical agents, but training and experience seems to 
influence infants’ goal attributions to mechanical agents, as evidenced by a study with 9- and 12-
month-olds (Hofer, Hauf, & Aschersleben, 2005). The 12-month-olds, but not the 9-month-olds, 




experience with the claw (e.g., showing the infants how the claw is operated), the infants then 
attributed goal-intentions to it. Although, an alternative argument is that infants, when given 
experience with a mechanical claw operated by a human, saw the claw as a tool, not a 
mechanical agent with its own goals (Hofer et al., 2005).  
 Conversely, in another study with infants of similar age, mere exposure to and 
familiarization of a mechanical claw did not aid 7- and 10-month old infants in imitating an 
action; only comparison also helps infants aged 7- to 10- month-olds attribute goals to 
mechanical claws. The important factor is if the infants can compare the tool action and align the 
claw’s goals with their own. Similar to the action training of Sommerville and colleagues 
(Sommerville et al., 2005), for infants, the ability to compare between their own goals and 
another agent’s goals (e.g., reaching for an object) is more beneficial to imitating the goals than 
merely watching (Gerson & Woodward, 2012). Thus, evidence supports the claim that an 
infant’s own action experience influences how – and to whom – they attribute goals. 
 A further contrasting account demonstrates that infants as young as 6 months old can 
assign goal-orientation to a mechanical claw after witnessing specific agentive cues (such as 
“self-propelledness, action-effect, and equifinality”), regardless of experience with the agent 
(Biro & Leslie, 2007). A complementary account argues that infants as young as 6 months of age 
do not need experience with the agent, nor did the agent need to be human or familiar, but as 
long as an agent exhibited the “abstract cues of goal-directedness” (Király et al., 2003). These 
accounts highlight specific action cues that could be parsed from action sequences to which 
infants are sensitive and can use to attribute agency and goals. Further evidence suggests that 
infants aged 12 months, but not those aged 9 months, do assign goal-attributions to a mechanical 




“salient change in the objects’ state” (Hofer et al., 2005). One important point: this is a different 
paradigm than the Woodward (1998) study, which had a human hand or mechanical entity reach 
and touch an object, without moving or changing the object. Critically, it is possible that this 
“salient change in objects’ state” is, in fact, what we would call an outcome, which would then 
change how this event is interpreted. Regardless, these results have led researchers to the 
conclusion that (a) infants do understand the differences in kinds of agents, whether human, 
mechanical or other, and (b) differentially assign intentions and goals to human and non-human 
agents. Yet, these methods and subsequent results are complex and do not always measure the 
exact same thing. However, one point is clear: together, this research suggests that infants do not 
reliably attribute goals to non-human (or mechanical) agents. 
 One question that arises is whether infants assign a mechanical claw with true agentive 
goals, or think of it as just a tool used by a human agent. Infants may have an “automatic bias” to 
assign intentional agency to humans, but not mechanical devices (Fields, 2014). This 
interpretation is reasonable, since 10- and 12-month-olds believe a human hand to be a more 
plausible action agent than a toy train (Saxe, Tenenbaum, & Carey, 2005). Generally, it seems 
that infants have difficulty overcoming an “automatic bias” to assign goals solely to human 
agents (Fields, 2014), and they perhaps do not clearly understand mechanical agents. To assign 
goal-orientation to a mechanical claw, infants may need experience, training, ability to compare, 
agentive cues, or some combination of these factors – importantly, none of which is necessary in 
order to assign goal-orientation to a human agent. 
 Evidence exists that: (a) infants can discriminate human agents versus non-human agents, 
and (b) and infants assign goal-directed behavior to human agents, but do not reliably do so for 




individual people. Infants mirror their own actions to the goals they see and an infant’s own 
action experience can influence how they attribute goals to agents. On the other hand, infants 
may not act similarly if the agent is not human, say, a mechanical hand or an inert rod. However, 
this is based on action cues, the environmental constraints, and amount of experience or training 
with the agent. Infants may have expectations about human agents and their goal-directed 
behavior, but these expectations may not be applied to non-human agents (Jovanovic et al., 
2007). However, it is possible for infants to ascribe a non-human agent with goals, but there are 
conditions under which this occurs.  
 Therefore, the evidence is not clear-cut and we need additional research to clarify how 
infants understand human and non-human agents, whether infants assume any kind of agent has 
goals, and how these concepts change throughout the course of infant development. Further, it is 




Infants use specific features of objects to individuate them, features ranging from 
differences in shape, size, color, sound, labels, or category membership. Occlusion tasks are one 
way to test how infants individuate objects. Further, infants are sensitive to the functional aspects 
of objects. An object’s function considers the relationship between objects, agents, actions, and 
outcomes, while considering both perceptual and conceptual information. Infants will use objects 
according to their function, as well as categorize and individuate objects based on demonstrated 
function. One caveat in the use of function during experiments with infants is the consideration 




Priming is one way to increase an infant’s sensitivity to specific characteristics of an 
object, which can help them during the object individuation process. Infants also need specific 
information linking a specific color to a specific function, as infants will not rely on mere color 
differences generally (Wilcox et al., 2008). For example, an object’s color can be highlighted by 
engaging objects in different functions (like scooping/pouring or pounding a nail; Wilcox & 
Chapa, 2004). If an infant links the object’s function to its color, they will rely on color as a 
salient object property, and then can use that information to an object individuation task. If a 
priming event has highlighted the importance of color, and then the infant will use color as a 
feature upon which to individuate the object.  
Agency is an important attribute for infants: who is performing an action or event they 
are watching? Agents perform actions with goals, and the interaction between the kind of agent 
and the action and goal is important. Infants have a possible bias toward human agents. At a 
young age, infants will assign goals and intentions to human agents, which could simply be a 
human hand. Infants have different expectations for non-human agents and do not necessarily 





3. PREDICTIONS AND CURRENT RESEARCH PROPOSAL 
 
How important is an agent to the emergent property of function? Function relies on the 
presence of an object and an action upon that object by an agent, resulting in a substantive 
outcome. If there is no object, action, or outcome, there is no function; thus, these are at least 
perceptually crucial pieces. What can be said about the presence of an agent within a functional 
event? 
Infants are sensitive to agent-produced information; in fact, agent produced motions are 
beneficial for category formation with infants aged 14 months (Booth, 2000), because “the 
interactions between agents and objects play a special role in infants’ discovery of new 
categories” (Booth, 2000). Agents are critical to the use of objects, as the links “allow objects to 
act as an interface between an actor’s goals and their motor system” (Bach et al., 2014). Infants 
can predict outcomes of actions and understand other’s actions (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). 
Therefore, agency is tightly linked with objects, actions on objects, goals, and outcomes. 
However, it is unknown exactly how agency is truly related to the emergent property of function. 
 These topics set the stage for this research to examine the roles of human and non-human 
agents within functional events. This research will contribute to the understanding of how agents 
– both human and non-human – contribute to the “emergent property” of function, as infants 
understand it. This research of familiarizing infants with the goals of human and non-human 
agents converges with the function research: agency is a critical piece of the function equation, 
especially if it is a human agent. If infants do not assign a goal or intention to a non-human 
agent, it is possible that the perception of function degrades. This brings to bear the importance 




important to infants and (b) how important is agency within the functional framework. I predict 
that agent – who is performing an action – plays an important role in the overall percept or 
emergent property of a functional event. 
This study has provided evidence to determine the influence of the agent performing an 
event to the priming scenario. Further, this study demonstrated how the agent (e.g., who/what 
entity is performing an event) contributes to how infants perceive object function. Specifically, 
this hypothesis tested whether infants evidence individuation-by-color after watching priming 
trials performed by a mechanical hand agent. There are several reasons why we predicted they 
will not. First, as previously discussed, infants do not reliably assign goal orientation to 
mechanical entities. In this testing scenario, were not provided the visual cues necessary for 
infants to attribute goal orientation to our mechanical agent, namely self-propelledness, action 
effect, or equifinality (Biro & Leslie, 2007). In absence of these cues, infants should interpret the 
mechanical hand as a non-self-propelled, inert agent, and not ascribe intentionality or goal-
directedness to it. Second, based on previous neuroimaging research with infants in the same age 
range, we have found that the infant brain distinguishes agents while using a functional object 
(Biondi et al., 2016). Specifically, the left hemisphere showed increased cortical activation to the 
human agent, but only in the context of the functional event. After infants watched the priming 
trials performed by a mechanical agent, the infants then watched an event-mapping task to assess 
object individuation based on surface color.  
This experiment an extension of previous work (Wilcox & Chapa, 2004; Wilcox, 
Hirshkowitz, Hawkins, & Boas, 2014): in both previous studies, an event-monitoring task was 




removed during test trials. In the current proposed study, we employ a one-trajectory event-
mapping task, where after the occlusion interval, the occluder is removed and stage is revealed.  
Event mapping requires the infant to match the first object position with the second object 
position. However, the occlusion event was followed by a non-occlusion event, the final phase, 
where the screen is removed to reveal the stage behind it. Typically, the occlusion screen is wide 
enough to conceal both objects, but when it is removed, it may reveal other objects behind it, or 
nothing at all.  
 If the infant successfully individuates by color, they will expect to see two objects in the 
color-change condition and will be surprised to see only one object on the stage when the 
occluder is removed. Infants would then look longer at the final phase of the test trial during the 
color change trials, as compared to the control trials. The object of this study is to determine how 
infants individuate based on the agent type they watched perform the priming events. Infants in 
the human hand condition should evidence color-function priming and should individuate by 
color during the test trials. However, infants in the mechanical hand condition should not 
evidence color-function and should not individuate by color during the test trials. We chose this 
methodology for several reasons. First, the one trajectory event-mapping task has been 
demonstrated to be simpler to comprehend in infants, as compared to multi-trajectory event-
mapping tasks (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b). As our age group is aged 8-10 months, we predict 
that this one trajectory event-mapping task will be effective and provide similar results as 
previous work using the event-monitoring tasks. Previous research has indicated that infants 
aged 9.5 months can succeed in an event-mapping task with one trajectory change (Wilcox & 




shape, pattern, and color. The current work proposes use of surface color change only. Thus, we 
will be able to extend previous results with a modification in the methodology. 
3.1 Research Methods  
3.1.1 Participants 
 Eighty infants healthy full-term aged 9.5 months participated in this study (M = 288 days, 
SD = 21 days; range = 241-330 days). The gender, ethnic, and racial representation of our sample 
consisted of 39 females and 41 males; 15 infants identified as Hispanic/Latino, 62 infants 
identified as not Hispanic/Latino, and 3 infants chose not to identify ethnicity; 60 infants 
identified as white, 6 infants identified as Asian, 1 infant identified as Black/African American, 
11 infants identified as more than one race, and 2 infants chose to not identify race. 
Parents were recruited primarily by commercially available lists, social media, or word of mouth, 
and given $5 and a t-shirt for their participation. Exclusionary criteria included: procedural 
problems during any part of the study1 (n = 14), inability to complete at least 1 test trial (n = 1), 
parental interference/environmental distractions (n = 8), or infant fussiness (n =5). Infants were 
randomly assigned to one of two agent conditions: human hand (n = 40) or mechanical hand (n = 
40). Further, infants within each condition saw either color-change test trials (n = 20 for each 






1 While this might seem like a high number of infants excluded, it is important to consider the context of the entire 
study environment. We had seven undergraduate students manipulating multiple objects across two blocks of trials, 




3.1.2 Apparatus & Objects  
 
 All events were performed in a wooden puppet stage apparatus, with real, 3-D objects. 
The apparatus was 213 cm high x 105 cm wide x 43.5 cm deep. Video recordings were taken of 
all events, plus the infants’ affect and attention to the apparatus, for review if necessary. A 
fabric-covered screen, concealing the stage, was raised to begin and lowered to end each priming 
trial and test trial. Two naïve observers observed the infant’s visual behavior through a hole in 
fabric-covered screens on either side of the infant. 
 
 
Figure 3. The three pairs of cups used in all conditions by both the human and mechanical 
agents. The pairs were always presented in the same order, though it was counterbalanced 
whether the green or red pairs were presented first. Reprinted from Biondi et al., 2016.  
 
 Three pairs of cups were used in the priming events. Each pair had one green cup and one 




but had slightly different shapes and handles (Figure 3). These three pairs were always presented 
in the same order. The green cups engaged in pounding a wooden nail, and the red cups engaged 
in a scooping and pouring action with a container of rice. The green cups always pounded a nail 
box and the red cups always poured from a rice box, so the object color predicted the event in 
which the object engaged.  
Two natural-colored wooden boxes, each with four wooden legs, were used as the 
function containers. The size of both boxes was 23.5 cm (width) x 13 cm (height) x 15.5 cm 
(depth), including the 12 cm legs. Both boxes had an open side facing up to form a container. 
Rice filled this opening for the pour events, and it was empty for the pound events except for an 
additional 12 cm wooden nail that protruded from the top. 
The balls used in the test events were 10.25 cm in diameter, made of Styrofoam, and 
painted the same hue of green and red as the cups from the priming trials. The occlusion screen 
was 30 cm (width) x 19.5 cm (height), and connected to a wooden dowel, which was used to flip 
it down to reveal the contents behind it.  
3.1.3 Testing Events  
 
Priming Trials 
 Each experimental session began with six priming trials, followed by four test trials. The 
same experimenter performed both the priming and test events. A metronome set to 60 beats per 
second softly clicked during the experimental session. 
 The six priming trials were set up as three pairs of trials, and each pair consisted of a 
pound trial and a pour trial (Figures 4 and 5). Infants were randomly assigned to watch the 




were performed by either a human hand covered with a black glove (human hand condition), or a 
mechanical grabber tool painted black (mechanical hand condition).  
Trials (pound or pour) were counterbalanced between infants. Each priming trial was 30 s 
in duration, during which infants watched four complete cycles of each event. Each pair of 
pound and pour trials were seen with a different pair of green and red containers (Figure 3). The 
priming events and test trials were similar to events seen in previous work (Biondi et al., 2016; 
Wilcox & Chapa, 2004; Wilcox et al., 2014).  
Each eight-second event cycle for the pour trials showed the cup in a still neutral position 
above the rice container (2 s), moving down to scoop the rice for (2 s), returning to a neutral 
position above the rice box (2 s), and finally pouring the rice out and returning to neutral position 
(2 s). This cycle was then repeated until the infant looked away for two consecutive seconds, at 
which point the trial ended and a pound trial began. 
Each eight-second event for the pound trials showed the cup being held in neutral 
position above the nail box (2 s), pounding the nail twice on the beat (2 s), returning to neutral 
position (2 s), followed by two more pounds on the nail twice on the beat (2 s). The cycle was 
then repeated until the infant looked away for two consecutive seconds, at which point the trial 
ended and a pour trial began (until six priming trials had been completed). Review Figures 4 and 








Figure 4. (a) Pound and (b) pour events, performed with a human hand obscured by a black 
glove. Reprinted from Biondi et al., 2016. 
 
Figure 5. (a) Pound and (b) pour events, performed with a mechanical hand painted black. 








Test Trials  
All test events were performed by human hand covered with a black glove. Each infant 
saw only one of two test trial types: color-change or control. In the control condition, a green ball 
began on the left side of an occluder screen, moved behind the screen, and a green ball emerged 
on the right side of the occluder screen. In the color change condition, a red ball began on the left 
side of an occluder screen, moved behind the screen, and a green ball emerged on the right side 
of the occluder screen (Figure 2)2. The occluder then was removed to reveal an empty stage 
behind it.  
 Each test trial began with the colored ball to the left (infant’s point of view) of the 
occluder screen. In the pre-trial phase, the ball “danced” in a stationary position, where the ball 
bounced left and right on the beat, until the infant looked at the ball for two seconds. Then the 
trial began, where the ball slid right (2 s), became occluded (2 s), slid out on the right side of the 
occlusion screen (2 s), then stopped at an equidistant point to resume “dancing” on the beat until 
the trial ended. The occlusion screen flipped down (seven seconds after the initiation of the ball 
slide) and the ball continued dancing until the infant looked away for two consecutive seconds, at 
which point the trial ended and another test trial began (until four test trials had been completed). 
  
____________________ 
2 There are, of course, four possible combinations of objects that we could use in the event-mapping test trials: 1) 
red-red, 2) green-green, 3) red-green, and 4) green-red. Ideally, we would use all four combinations, but for 
simplicity sake (in data collection and analysis), we chose red-green for color change trials and green-green for 
control trials. This was done so the result of both final phases was a green ball, and that increased looking to the 





 Infants sat in their parents lap in a quiet room and watched the events on a puppet-stage 
apparatus. The infants sat on their parents lap approximately 75 cm from the stage. Trained 
experimenters produced the events with a precise, timed script (see above section for specific 
timing of all events). One experimenter performed the priming trials, and two experimenters 
performed the test trials (all human hands were disguised using black gloves, to obscure changes 
in identity during the test trial events). During the priming trials, the infant watched events 
appropriate to their condition on six successive trials. Each trial ended when (a) the infant looked 
away for two consecutive seconds, after watching for at least 12 cumulative seconds; or (b) after 
30 seconds. The looking time data was coded by hand via the two observers in real time. The 
computer signaled a tone when the trial should end and the curtain was lowered, ending the trial.  
During the test trials, infants watched events appropriate to their condition. Each trial 
ended when (a) the infant looked away for 2 consecutive seconds after watching the event for 8 
seconds, or (b) after 60 seconds. Each infant was presented with the same number of 
familiarization and test trials. Similar to the priming trials, the computer signaled a tone when the 
trial should end and the curtain was lowered, ending the trial.  
 Two observers, naive to the condition infants are assigned, monitored infants’ looking 
behavior through peepholes in the frames on either side of the apparatus. Each observer used a 
game controller connected to a Dell computer and depressed a button when the infants attended 
to the event. The looking times by the primary observer was used in data analysis. Inter-observer 
agreement was calculated and averaged 94.45% (SD = 0.03). Total duration of looking (i.e., 







4.1 Priming Trials 
Preliminary analyses were performed to determine whether male or female infants 
responded differently to the priming events. First, looking time to the six priming trials was 
averaged (across all six priming trials) and analyzed via a multivariate 2 (gender) x 2 (agent 
type) x 2 (test type) ANOVA. The following main effects were not significant: gender, F(1,79) = 
1.599, p = 0.210, ηp² = 0.022; agent F(1,79) = 0.123, p = 0.727, ηp² = 0.002; test type, F(1,79) = 
0.054, p = 0.817, ηp² = 0.001. The following interactions were not significant: agent x test type, 
F(1,79) = 0.802, p = 0.374, ηp² = 0.011; agent x gender, F(1,79) = 0.887, p = 0.349, ηp² = 0.012; 
test x gender, F(1,79) = 1.384, p = 0.243, ηp² = 0.019; agent x test x gender, F(1,79) = 0.000, p = 
0.990, ηp² = 0.000. 
In summary, we found no statistically significant differences between looking times to 
any of the priming trials by gender, agent type, or test type, nor were there any statistically 
signifant interactions. Thus, we collapsed across gender for the remaining priming trial analyses. 
However, due to relatively small sample sizes, we interpret null results with caution.  
Next, infants’ mean looking times (averaged across all six priming trials) were analyzed 
by means of 2 (agent type) x 2 (test type) ANOVA. The main effect of agent was not significant, 
F(1,79) = 0.026, p = 0.264, ηp² = 0.000, nor was the main effect of test type significant, F(1,79) 
= 0.00, p = 0.997, ηp² = 0.000. The interaction between agent and test type was not significant, 
F(1,79) = 0.428, p = 0.515, ηp² = 0.005. Infants in all four conditions looked almost equally at 
the priming events (Table 1). Therefore, we did not add priming trials as a covariate during our 





  Test Condition 
Agent Color-Change Control 
Human 24.99 (4.02) 24.37 (4.66) 
Mechanical  24.22 (4.56) 24.83 (3.53) 
 
Table 1. Total looking time to the priming trials, by agent and test condition. Means and 
standard deviations (in parentheses) are shown. 
 
 
4.2 Test Trials: Initial Phase 
Next, infants’ mean looking times (averaged across test trials 1 and 2) to the initial phase 
(occlusion event) were analyzed by means of a 2 (agent type) x 2 (test type) ANOVA. The main 
effect of agent was not significant, F(1,79) = 0.064, p = 0.801, ηp² = 0.001, nor was the main 
effect of test type significant, F(1,79) = 1.600, p = 0.210, ηp² = 0.021. The interaction between 
agent and test type was not significant, F(1,79) = 1.638, p = 0.205, ηp² = 0.020. Infants in all 
four conditions looked almost equally at the scene during the initial phase (Table 2).  
 
 
  Test Condition 
Agent Color-Change Control 
Human 6.75 (0.52) 6.75 (0.52) 
Mechanical  6.90 (0.27) 6.52 (1.07) 
 
Table 2. Total looking time to the initial phase of the test trial (occlusion interval), by agent and 






4.3 Test Trials: Final Phase 
First, looking time to the first two test trials was averaged and analyzed via a multivariate 
2 (gender) x 2 (agent type) x 2 (test type) ANOVA. The following main effects were not 
significant: gender, F(1,79) = 0.083, p = 0.774, ηp² = 0.001; agent F(1,79) = 1.089, p = 0.300, 
ηp² = 0.015; test type, F(1,79) = 2.743, p = 0.102, ηp² = 0.037. The following interactions were 
not significant: agent x gender, F(1,79) = 1.643, p = 0.204, ηp² = 0.022; test x gender, F(1,79) = 
0.255, p = 0.615, ηp² = 0.004; agent x test x gender, F(1,79) = 0.038, p = 0.845, ηp² = 0.001. The 
following interaction was significant: agent x test type, F(1,79) = 4.227, p = 0.043, ηp² = 0.055. 
Due to the very small size of each cell for gender, this should be interpreted with caution.  
In summary, we found no statistically significant differences between looking times to 
any of the priming trials by gender, agent type, or test type, nor were there any statistically 
signifant interactions, except for one. Thus, we collapsed across gender for the remaining test 
trial analyses. However, due to relatively small sample sizes, we interpret null results with 
caution.  
Next, infants’ mean looking times (averaged across test trials 1 and 2, using the two-
second look away times) to the final phase (after the occlusion event, when the occluder was 
removed) were analyzed by means of a 2 (agent type) x 2 (test type) ANOVA. The main effect 
of agent was not significant, F(1,79) = 1.267, p = 0.264, ηp² = 0.015, nor was the main effect of 
test type significant, F(1,79) = 3.323, p = 0.072, ηp² = 0.040. The interaction between agent and 
test type was significant, F(1,79) = 4.243, p = 0.043, ηp² = 0.051. Infants looked longest at the 
final phase of color-change trial events if they had first seen the priming trials performed by a 






  Test Condition 
Agent Color-Change Control 
Human 29.68 (12.82) 20.34 (10.65) 
Mechanical  22.01 (9.69) 22.58 (9.34) 
 
Table 3. Total looking time to the final phase of the test trial (after the occlusion interval), by 
agent and test condition. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are shown. 
 
 
Follow up analyses were set to perform three follow-up comparisons using independent 
samples t-tests: 1) human hand priming trials, color change vs. control test trials; 2) mechanical 
hand priming trials, color change vs. control test trials; 3) human hand priming trials, color 
change test trials vs. mechanical hand priming trials, color change test trials.  
First, when the priming trials were performed by a human hand, infants looked longer to 
the final phase of the test trial if they were in the color change condition (M = 29.68, SD = 12.82) 
than if they were in the control condition (M = 20.34, SD = 10.65), t(38) = 2.492, p = 0.017;  
Cohen’s d = 0.79. The effect size for this analysis (d = 0.79) was found to be in Cohen’s (1988) 
convention for medium effect size, but very close to being classified as a large effect size. 
Second, when the priming trials were performed by a mechanical hand, infants looked 
equally at the final phase of the trial whether they were in the color change test condition (M = 
22.01, SD = 9.69) or the control test condition (M = 22.58, SD = 9.34), t(38) = -0.189, p > 0.05; 
Cohen’s d = 0.06. The effect size for this analysis (d = 0.06) was found to be below Cohen’s 
(1988) convention for small effect size. 
Third, infants looked longer to the final phase of the test trial during the color change 




than if the performed by a mechanical hand (M = 22.01, SD = 9.69), t(40) = 2.185, p = 0.35; 
Cohen’s d = 0.67. The effect size for this analysis (d = 0.67) was found to be in Cohen’s (1988) 
convention for medium effect size. 
 In conclusion, infants looked longer at the final phase of the event if they 1) were 
watching the color change test trials, and 2) they had first seen the human hand performing the 







 There is extant behavioral work demonstrating that infants can individuate objects by 
surface features, such as color. Further, the features that infants use as basis for individuation is 
malleable with experience, such as color-function priming. Infants respond differently to human 
vs. non-human or mechanical agents. Most critically to this work, infants regularly attribute goal-
orientation to human agents but do not reliably do so for mechanical agents. Finally, infants use 
an object’s functional properties to glean information about what they see and can apply what 
they learn to novel contexts.  
The current study has investigated whether human or mechanical agents performing 
color-function priming events influence (a) how infants learn whether color has predictive value, 
and (b) whether infants apply what they have learned to a novel object individuation task. We 
had several predictions. First, we anticipated that infants in the human agent priming condition 
would evidence greater looking during the final phase of the event of the color-change test trials, 
as compared to infants in the control test trials. Next, we anticipated that infants in the 
mechanical agent priming condition would evidence equal looking during the final phase of the 
event during both the color-change and control test trials. Finally, we anticipated that infants in 
the human hand priming condition will evidence an increase in looking time to the final phase of 
the color-change test trials, as compared to infants in the mechanical hand priming condition 
during the color-change trials. Two main findings emerged. 
First, the results have demonstrated that infants can be primed to attend to color-change 
events during object individuation tasks, using a one-trajectory event mapping procedure. Infants 




the human hand perform the priming events. Then, on separate event-mapping occlusion tasks, 
infants who watched the human hand perform the priming events expected to see: a) one object 
during the control test trials, and were not surprised, as evidenced by short total looking time, 
and b) two objects during the color-change test trials, and were surprised to see only one object, 
as evidenced by prolonged looking. We found that infants aged 9 months are successful at 
individuating by color during an event mapping procedure. Previous color-function priming 
studies used event monitoring tasks to test object individuation abilities in infants 9 months of 
age (Wilcox & Chapa 2004; Wilcox, 2008). The current results demonstrate an additional object-
individuation task type that infants can accomplish.   
Second, this study demonstrated that infants cannot be primed to attend to color-change 
events during object individuation tasks, if the agent demonstrating the priming events is a 
mechanical hand. Infants watched 6 pound-pour priming trials and, since the agent performing 
the tasks was mechanical, were not able to link color to object function. Then, on separate event-
mapping occlusion tasks, infants looked equally during the event-mapping trial, regardless if 
they saw the color-change or control condition. This finding is relevant for object occlusion 
research with infants, as we will outline restricted conditions under which infants can and cannot 
succeed during event-mapping object occlusion tasks. This finding also sheds light on how 
infants understand functional events and the agents that perform them. Further implications of 
this finding will be addressed. 
These results fit within and support the existing literature. First, infants learned from the 
human hand, but not the mechanical hand, that color has predictive value and is linked to a 
specific and unique function – namely, red-pour and green-pound. Second, infants can then draw 




paradigm. The data from this study shows that infants did in fact draw upon the information 
gathered during the priming trials and applied that knowledge to a completely novel experience 
of the individuation task, but only when the color-function priming trials were performed by the 
human hand agent.  
Why would this be? In the priming trials, we taught the infants that color differences 
predict an object’s function. For example, Cup 1 was colored red, and performed the action of 
scooping and pouring rice. Cup 2 was colored green, and performed the action of pounding the 
nail. Cup 3 was also red, like Cup 1, and also scooped and poured rice. We provided infants three 
exemplars, which is critical for category formation and color-function priming (Wilcox & Chapa, 
2004; Wilcox, Woods, & Chapa, 2008). In this case, red objects scoop and pour while green 
objects pound the nail. Then, they could draw upon that color information when deciding on how 
many objects were in the scene during the test trial. Red and green objects look different, but 
more importantly they perform completely different functions. Therefore, it is vital to consider 
red and green objects as distinct entities numerically. These results have been demonstrated in 
previous studies with similar methods (Wilcox & Chapa, 2004; Wilcox et al., 2011, 2008; 
Woods & Wilcox, 2010) 
The critical element in this study is the difference in looking time to the final phase of the 
test trials after watching the human or mechanical hand engage in the color-function priming 
events. The results of this study revealed significant differences in both the human hand color-
change vs. control test trials, as well as the human hand color-change vs. mechanical hand color-
change test trials. Infants who watched the human hand perform the color-function events 




the test events. However, infants who watched the mechanical hand perform the color-function 
events did not learn from the agent that color has predictive value.  
One explanation is that infants do, in fact, ascribe intentions and goal-directedness to 
human agents, but not mechanical agents. Infants watched the two agents perform the pound-
pour events, but only believed the human hand to be moving in a goal-oriented manner. 
Therefore, infants learned from the human hand but not the mechanical hand that 1) color is 
predictive of object function and 2) can be used as a reliable feature upon which to individuate 
objects. Why wouldn’t the events themselves provide enough information to invoke color-
function priming, regardless of the agent performing them? If this was the case, we would have 
seen equal looking times to the final phase of the test trials, regardless of the priming condition 
the infants were in. However, we did not. First, my working hypothesis underscoring the 
Function Equation is that action upon objects by agents with a specific outcome is what 
comprises the “emergent property” of function. Second, these results also highlight the goal-
oriented nature of this action upon objects, the kind of actions that are only viewed as intentional 
when completed by a human agent. While the mechanical hand still performed the same pound-
pour events, they were not viewed as intentional to infants. Therefore, infants did not view the 
events as functionally-relevant in nature and did not learn from them that color has predictive 
value. In sum, it is 1) the presence of agents (and based on these results, particularly human 
agents) engaging in the events, and 2) the intentionality of the events which allow for the infants 
to view the event as functionally relevant and enables the color-function priming. 
Another explanation is that infants do (or can) ascribe intentions and goal-directedness to 
many kinds of agents, including mechanical agents, and action by any type of agent on an object 




likely seen no difference in looking time to the color change test trials whether infants first 
watched human or mechanical hands perform the priming trials. However, we did see a 
difference in looking time between those two groups, leading us to question this conclusion. 
There were two tasks involved in this study: a functionally-relevant event, followed by an event-
mapping object individuation task. Two logical explanations follow: 1) in our case, the task 
demands were more challenging, and although the infants might have attributed goal-
directedness to the mechanical hand, we did not see a transfer of knowledge to the second task; 
and 2) since the individuation task was not a functional event, perhaps that is where the 
translation failed. However, this seems unlikely, given that infants in this age range have 
succeeded in the same kind of color-function priming, as evidenced by object individuation, in 
other studies (Wilcox & Chapa, 2004; Wilcox et al., 2008). 
In previous work, researchers found that infants need specific types of cues to view a 
mechanical agent as possessing goal-directedness – namely “self-propelledness, action-effect, 
and equifinality” (Biro & Leslie, 2007). The authors claim that the “specific appearance of the 
actor is not critical for infants’ judgments of agency” (Biro & Leslie, 2007). However, in our 
study, the appearance of the actor was the only thing that changed. First, equifinial variations in 
the behavior likely occurred, as the infants watched the cups scoop and pour several times. 
Although the experimenters were trained well, one can assume small variations in movement 
along the XY axis of the stage during the scooping and pounding actions, as is typical when 
humans are engaged in many repetitive motor activities. Second, the action effect of scooping 
and pounding were sufficiently salient, as they resulted in outcomes of the hammering sound and 
pouring of rice (a change of state). Third, the agents moved in a self-propelled manner while 




results, infants only demonstrated individuation by color after watching the human hands 
perform the priming events. In the original paper, the youngest group of infants at 6 months of 
age were able to attribute goal-directedness to the non-human agent when all three cues were 
present (Biro & Leslie, 2007). One final important note: although the mechanical agent appeared 
different than the human hand, it was still operated by a human experimenter and exhibited the 
three cues necessary to provide evidence of goal-directedness as based on the Biro & Leslie 
(2007) cue-based account. Since all three cues were present for both agents, and the only element 
that changed between conditions was the appearance of the agent, it seems that appearance of 
the agent is critical to infants’ understanding of the priming events and extraction of color-
function rules. Perhaps appearance of the agent is the cue that leads infants to form different 
expectations about the events they are watching.  
One way to address this is by employing eye tracking technology. Corneal reflection eye 
tracking provides highly accurate assessments of looking patterns to complex scenes. Therefore, 
we would have a more complete sense of whether infants were looking at the agent, the 
container, or the object engaging in the event. If we saw group differences in looking to any part 
of the scene, we would have a better understanding of how the infants parsed the event, which 
may influence their later performance on the object individuation task.  
Another question that arises is whether these results point to infants’ familiarization with 
human hands. Human hands are involved in feeding, playing, comforting, and caring for infants 
daily. This could result in a framework for infants of evidence from prior experience. Could the 
current results simply indicate infants’ ability to distinguish familiar agent vs. unfamiliar agent, 
or did the infants in the current study see the mechanical hand as unfamiliar? Other researchers 




agent, they have different expectations and responses to the event (Boyer, Pan, & Bertenthal, 
2011). One way to test this possibility is to present and familiarize the infants to the mechanical 
agents, then perform the same color-function priming events, followed by the same event-
mapping individuation tasks. This would help determine whether the current results were due to 
a difference in familiarity between the human and mechanical agents we used. 
This all leads to a final question: is there a reason that infants appear to privilege human 
agents in this context? Is it appearance, familiarity, the agent’s underlying goals, or something 
else? In our previous work, we showed similar pound-pour priming trials to infants while 
measuring hemodynamic response in bilateral temporal cortex using functional near-infrared 
spectroscopy (fNIRS) (Biondi et al., 2016). We found two main results: 1) increased HbO in the 
left temporal regions, only when infants watched the human hand performing functionally-
relevant events, and 2) increased HbO to human vs. mechanical hands in the right temporal 
region of the brain (irrespective of functional relevance of the events). We attributed these 
differences in cortical response to the identity of the agent, but not the possible underlying goals 
or intentionality of the agent. In the current study, we are building on the fNIRS results, as the 
priming events are used as a learning mechanism to then test infants’ knowledge of how many 
objects are in the final phase of the event-mapping trials. Since infants looked longest at the final 
phase of the test event only in the human hand color change condition, we can infer that the 
information gathered by these infants only in this condition was different and sufficient to induce 
priming. And the difference was simply the agent who performed the pound-pour priming 
events.  
In the fNIRS work, the distinction between human vs. mechanical agents warranted 




functionally-relevant events. In the current study, we only tested functionally relevant events. If 
we showed infants a mechanical hand engaging in non-functionally-relevant events, we would 
anticipate no color-function priming, based on previous results where human agents used objects 
to engage in non-functionally-relevant events (Wilcox & Chapa, 2004; Wilcox, Woods, & 
Chapa, 2008). Further, in our previous work with fNIRS, we found no activation in temporal 
regions to mechanical agents performing either functionally-relevant or non-functionally-
relevant events (Biondi, Boas, & Wilcox, 2016). These results point to perhaps different cortical 
networks that are engaged when infants view 1) human agents, 2) functionally-relevant events, 
and 3) or both, signaling the importance of the relationship between them. 
Together, this data further demonstrates that infants have different expectation for human 
vs. mechanical entities. Using an assessment of looking behavior, we found that infants were 
able to successfully individuate objects by color only if they witness the human hand agents 
engage in functionally-relevant priming events, but not if mechanical hand agents engaged in the 
same kind of event. These results shine a light on the developmental mechanisms of how infants 
learn about the world around them. Future studies will use looking time and measures of neural 
activation (e.g., fNIRS) to continue assessing infants’ representation of functional events as 
influenced by the agents performing them, characteristics of the objects themselves, actions on 
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